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author's theory enables him to reject the monistic systems of idealism and materialism, and to prove the inadequacy of Avenarius' conception of mental life as *Erhaltung des Gehirns*. A discussion of the physical part-conditions of the judgment function shows its importance for the categories of reality, causality and substantiality, and for the origination of the number concept. Causality is, in primitive experience, the interaction of psychical (intuitively apprehended) and physical. (It is interesting to compare this view with Exner's account of the biological origin of the causal notion from the visual perception of movement.) Finally, the totality of physical and psychical occurrence is to be regarded as the efflux of a divine will.

These epistemological and metaphysical consequences of the writer's thesis are evidence of its 'life' and many-sided applicability. To consider them in detail would here be out of place. For the psychologist, as was said just now, the third is the cardinal chapter of the book. His interest will lie in the testing of Professor Jerusalem's theory by concrete instances taken from all possible departments of logic,—in the translation of logic, by its aid, into psychology. This interest can subsist alongside even of a complete rejection of the author's psychophysics and metaphysics.

E. B. T.

*Die moderne physiologische Psychologie in Deutschland. Ein historisch-kritische Untersuchung mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Problems der Aufmerksamkeit.* Von DR. W. HEINRICH. Zürich 1895, pp. 232, 4 marks.

In the introduction Dr. Heinrich gives a concise *résumé* of the leading psychologists preceding Fechner, discussing especially their contributions to the question of attention. As important for the modern psychological views of parallelism and attention, he naturally lays stress upon the mechanical views of Descartes and Herbart. Herbart's two definitions of attention are quoted and criticised: "*Ursprünglich ist die Aufmerksamkeit nichts anderes, als die Fähigkeit, einen Zuwachs der Vorstellungen zu erzeugen,*" and "*Attentus dicitur is qui mente sic est dispositus ut ejus notiones incrementi quid capere possint.*" *De attentionis mensura*, etc. *Re* voluntary attention Herbart says that our psychical life has its pure mechanical laws, but that they are laws of its own nature, not borrowed of the corporeal world; yet are they more similar to the Laws of *Druck und Stoss* than to the miracle of a "*vorgeblich unbegreiflicher Freiheit.*" Ulrici and Lotze are said to form the transition from "psychology with a soul" to "psychology without a soul." Lotze's fine but unsystematic observations on attention are properly estimated. "With Lotze we leave behind the province of 'psychology with a soul'" and proceed to the teachings of the modern writers, who take into account the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy. "With the introduction of this principle and the increased number of observed facts which made the dependence of the psychical on the physiological and pathological changes an unassailable certainty," psychology entered upon the great experimental road which it is for her now to follow.

Fechner's work is outlined fairly. As direct result of the physical principle of the Conservation of Energy, the principle of *Psychophysical Parallelism* was emphasized; from this again arose the Law of the Relations of the Psychical to the Physical, or *Weber's Law*, and at the same time the different *Methods of Measurement* in psychophysical research. Hence Fechner is "*Vater der Psychophysik und Vater der experimentellen Psychologie.*"

G. E. Müller's excellent little work on Attention is criticised, also his disciple's Pilzecker. The defects of both might have been more fully emphasized.

Wundt's observations on attention are said to be faulty and defective, and his views to be too much influenced by his philosophical conceptions. Wundt's definition of attention: an activity which is perceived along with the going and coming of presentations, and which is accompanied subjectively by a feeling which cannot be more nearly defined,—is strongly criticised.

N. Lange, Külpe, Ziehen and Münsterberg receive sympathetic handling. He makes Münsterberg a disciple of Ribot, inasmuch as attention is regarded by both as a complex of muscle-sensations, and the fluctuation of attention as dependent upon the fluctuation in the strength of muscular contractions.

The author's standpoint is that of Avenarius. His exposition is generally fair; his criticism might often have been severer. He strangely omits all mention of the work of Profs. Ebbinghaus, Hering, Lipps and Stumpf, the latter's well-known theory of attention being not once mentioned.

ARTHUR ALLIN.

*Die Gefühle und ihr Verhältnis zu den Empfindungen.* Antrittsvorlesung. Von DR. MAX VON FREY, 1894.

Of the many recent researches into the nature of pain and pleasure and their physiological causes or concomitants (Marshall, Nagel, Nichols, Strong, Oppenheimer, Goldscheider and others), Dr. Frey has contributed his share. His contributions to the physiology of the pain-sense have already been ably reviewed in this JOURNAL (Vol. VII, pp. 113 ff.) by Mr. Luckey. We have here a compact survey of the more general field of feelings in their relation to what are ordinarily called sensations. The characteristic of feeling, whenever it is associated or accompanied by sensation, is held to be the reference to the personality of the person experiencing the sensation. What "personality" may mean here, whether parts of our organism or the mental self, is not explained. He maintains his former thesis that pure sensations, *e. g.*, touch, may be had without any accompaniment of pleasure or pain, and that pain has its own separate nerve endings and pain-conducting nerves. Such are denied the feelings of pleasure, which are somehow connected with the cessation of pain, tension, etc. The "shunt-theory" of Wundt and the older school is not accepted, the objections to it being too conclusive. The pain sense is the only one possessing organs almost everywhere in the body. This great amount of distribution, its usual lack of reference to the objects of stimulation, and its full reference to the organism stimulated, form the first and most pressing step in the formation of a presentation complex, known as the ego. The connection of this with that primordial characteristic, irritability, might have been pointed out.

He disallows the James-Lange theory, but approves of that of Meynert, which to me is largely the same, though not developed enough. By the way, Meynert published his theory of the emotions in 1880, "*Ueber die Gefühle*," now published in his "*Sammlung*;" the James-Lange theory appeared in 1884. Frey's arguments against separate nerve endings for pleasure are not conclusive. His distinction, the general one, between feeling and sensations, has probably worked more harm than good. Frey's answer to the strictures of Nagel (*Pflüger's Archiv*, LIX, 1895) upon